Naturalized epistemology and the study of language
pp. 235-257
in: Abner Shimony, Debra Nails (eds), Naturalistic epistemology, Berlin, Springer, 1987Abstract
Quine (1969) in "Epistemology Naturalized', attacks an entire conception of how philosophy ought to approach the topic of human knowledge. This conception, which we could call external epistemology, relies on a number of distinctions which are unsupportable by Quine's lights: a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge, necessary vs. contingent truth, matters of meaning vs. matters of fact. Lying at the basis of these distinctions are the assumptions that there are such things as linguistic rules, and that these rules have a crucial role to play in a philosophical account of knowledge. Quine's attack on external epistemology is ultimately an attack on these fundamental assumptions.
