Vagueness, truth and permissive consequence
pp. 409-430
in: Theodora Achourioti, Henri Galinon, José Martínez Fernández, Kentaro Fujimoto (eds), Unifying the philosophy of truth, Berlin, Springer, 2015Abstract
We say that a sentence A is a permissive consequence of a set of premises Γ whenever, if all the premises of Γ hold up to some standard, then A holds to some weaker standard. In this paper, we focus on a three-valued version of this notion, which we call strict-to-tolerant consequence, and discuss its fruitfulness toward a unified treatment of the paradoxes of vagueness and self-referential truth. For vagueness, st-consequence supports the principle of tolerance; for truth, it supports the requisit of transparency. Permissive consequence is non-transitive, however, but this feature is argued to be an essential component to the understanding of paradoxical reasoning in cases involving vagueness or self-reference.