Carnap, logicism, and ontological commitment
pp. 337-352
in: Sorin Costreie (ed), Early analytic philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 2016Abstract
Throughout most of his career, Rudolf Carnap attempted to articulate an empiricist view. Central to this project is the understanding of how empiricism can be made compatible with abstract objects that seem to be invoked in mathematics. In this paper, I discuss and critically evaluate three moves made by Carnap to accommodate mathematical talk within his empiricist program: (i) the "weak logicism" in the Aufbau; (ii) the combination of formalism and logicism in the Logische Syntax; and (iii) the distinction between internal and external question characteristic of Carnap's involvement with modality. As a result, the clear interplay between Carnap's philosophy of science and his work in the philosophy of mathematics will emerge, as well as some challenges that need to be overcome along the way.
