Intentionality, consciousness and the system's perspective

Joëlle Proust

pp. 51-72

in: Denis Fisette (ed), Consciousness and intentionality, Berlin, Springer, 1999

Abstract

The question I will address has to do with the conditions that characterize a system as intentional, and that are also occasionally used in specifying what properties accrue to a conscious system. In the case of intentionality, it is required of a representation — i.e., in Dretske's terms, an indicator which has the function of indicating what it indicates — that it should not only be present in a system, but that it should have a meaning for that system. The same point is hammered in by Millikan (1993): The kind of natural sign that is used as an inner representation "must be one that functions as a sign or representation for the system itself" 86). Proponents of intentional approaches for consciousness tend to reconduct an analogous requirement: the intentional content of a conscious state should be somewhat centrally available in order to be fit for controlling reasoning, rational action and verbal report¹. I will call "globality condition" what is common to those two definitions.