Free will, responsibility and moral evil
pp. 107-121
in: , The human being, the world and God, Berlin, Springer, 2016Abstract
While the previous chapter considered empathy and compassion, this chapter looks at some reasons for why empathy and compassion sometimes fail to prevail. What could be the reasons that some dismiss or even lack empathy? Furthermore, where does free will come in? Is there something like free will or is free will always relative to a specific factor? Is free will equal to being free? In my opinion having free will and being free is not entirely the same. For instance, a drug addict may have freely chosen to start taking drugs, but after some time it is the drug that chooses the addict who is no longer a free person. Take the following example. I am completely free to choose what I want to do today, I may choose to continue writing on my book or I may choose to do something entirely different. However, I am not free from my duty to submit the book in time. Then, of course, one could try to refrain from making a choice, thinking in terms of "what has to happen also happens". However, that will not work, one will end up making a choice because "[w]e cannot think away our free will" (Searle 2007: 43). However, that we cannot think away our free will does not mean that we have absolute free will. In turn, this does not mean that free will is an illusion. As Searle expresses, "free will is a genuine feature of the world" (Searle 2007: 58). Therefore, it needs to have neurological correlations. The choices we make cannot be detached from our neurological set-up. This implies that human free will to do good or bad is at least partly hardwired in the brain.