Holism, molecularity and truth

Neil Tennant

pp. 31-58

in: Barry M. Taylor (ed), Michael Dummett, Berlin, Springer, 1987

Abstract

What is holism? Ironically, one has to confront almost the whole corpus of Michael Dummett's writings¹ to extract an answer; and considerations that prompt professions of holism are almost inextricable from those that support the thesis of inextricability. Dummett more than anyone has been both explicit about what he understands by holism, and forceful in his reasons for rejecting it. Still, there are vacillations in that understanding, usually tailored to the reasons for rejection. Can his formulations and criticisms of holism be improved upon? Can his doctrine of molecu-larity be refined? And can one find a middle position which recognises, with the holist, certain brute facts about complexity, but which descries, with the molecularist, enough manageable structure to get a satisfactory semantical theory going? I shall devote three sections to answering these questions affirmatively.

Cited authors

Dummett Michael