Realities and their relationships

Kenneth J. Gergen

pp. 51-62

in: Michael E. Hyland, William J. Baker, René van Hezewijk, Terwee (eds), Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1990

Abstract

From a social constructionist standpoint, foundational ontologies, such as materialism and phenomenology are hammered out of the discursive resources of the culture. Both generate their 'sense of reality" through rhetorical procedures. Thus, problems in epistemology are superfluous byproducts of simultaneously accepting two or more ontological posits (e.g., world and mind). In the constructionist view, 1) there is no transcendental means of justifying any given ontology, 2) new realms of reality are open to construction, and 3) important questions must be raised regarding the pragmatic consequences of competing reality posits.