Mental representation and meaning

arguments against the computational view

William E. Smythe

pp. 261-266

in: Michael E. Hyland, William J. Baker, René van Hezewijk, Terwee (eds), Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1990

Abstract

The present paper surveys and discusses some notable recent critiques of the computational theory of mind. Computational environments normally include at least three distinct levels: physical implementation, formal computation, and semantic interpretation. The computational theory of mind is problematic insofar as it attempts to collapse the semantic level onto the other two levels. The problems are brought into focus by discussing three recent critiques of computationalism by John Searle (1980, 1984), John Heil (1981), and Hilary Putnam (1988). It is argued that mental representation, like more public symbolic activities, functions relative to the interpretive practices of a community.

Cited authors

Searle John

Putnam Hilary

Heil John