Frege on truth

Tyler Burge

pp. 97-154

in: Leila Haaparanta, Jaakko Hintikka (eds), Frege synthesized, Berlin, Springer, 1986

Abstract

From a natural perspective, Frege's view that sentences denote (bedeuten) objects appears to be an irritating peculiarity. His claim that there are only two objects denoted by sentences and that these are Truth and Falsity has seemed to many to advance from the peculiar to the bizarre. Indeed, a standardized form of philosophical humor has grown up around talk of "naming the True". I think that the natural perspective is sound and that the humor has its point. But understanding Frege's motivations for these views provides insight into the fundamentals of his philosophical standpoint and method. Such insight enriches the natural perspective.

Cited authors

Frege Gottlob