Gödel's theorems and Church's thesis

Judson Webb

pp. 309-353

in: Robert S. Cohen, Mark W. Wartofsky (eds), Language, logic and method, Berlin, Springer, 1983

Abstract

Gödel's incompleteness theorems and their suite, including the undecidability theorems of Church, have figured essentially in numerous attempts of uneven quality to refute mechanism.¹ Most of these attempts have met with various equally uneven criticisms which have in turn stimulated refined, though still inconclusive, further attempts.² Professor Lucas, who himself is the author of several such attempts, frankly admits that "the application of Gödel's theorem to the problem of minds and machines is difficult" ([52], p. 145). He even concedes, in a rejoinder to my own uneven criticism of his position [82],

Cited authors

Gödel Kurt