A Wittgensteinian stance on psychological methods, objectivity, ontology and explanations

pp. 95-216

in: Gavin Brent Sullivan, Wittgenstein's philosophy in psychology, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017

Abstract

This chapter examines the limits and consequences of attempts to incorporate Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks and methods within psychology. Wittgensteinian criticisms of positivist and realist accounts of objectivity and pictures of psychological researchers as "independent" and "distant" are outlined, before conceptual problems with social constructionism and intelligibility as a critical criterion in psychology are "worked through". The ontological allure of realism is engaged with and a case is made for conceiving of Wittgenstein's later work as a framework that can make sense of demands in psychology to investigate hidden "levels' of processes and structures. Further sections highlight the "background" and contexts of social and psychological investigations, make sense of theories as enduring sources of insights and change, and clarify challenges to causal thinking in psychology.