The cognitive unconscious
pp. 203-214
in: Michael H. G. Hoffmann, Johannes Lenhard, Falk Seeger (eds), Activity and sign, Berlin, Springer, 2005Abstract
For a long time the cognitive unconscious was a marginal subject in the epistemology and psychology of the 20th century. In the last decades, however, this situation has dramatically changed under the influence of cognitive psychology and cognitive science. As a contribution to a better understanding of this change, its reasons, and its perspectives, this article tries to recall the history of the cognitive unconscious as a philosophical and psychological concept that does not begin with the rise of cognitive psychology and cognitive science. It links the concept to the philosphical criticism of Descartes and Kant as the most eminent proponents of a philosophy of consciousness. In particular, it links the concept to American pragmatism. By anchoring consciousness in practical and sign-mediated intersubjectivity, Peirce, Dewey, and Mead, at the same time laid the foundations for a pioneering conception of the cognitive unconscious that requires further elaboration and remains a stimulating challenge for current philosophical and psychological research.
