The persecution of absolutes

on the Kantian and neo-Kantian theories of science

Amos Funkenstein

pp. 39-63

in: Edna Ullmann-Margalit (ed), The kaleidoscope of science I, Berlin, Springer, 1986

Abstract

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason intends, in part, to be a theory of science; to what extent is a matter of interpretation. Of the German philosophical systems inspired by him, some sought to abolish, conserve and transform his premises all at once — in the famous triple sense that Hegel ascribed to 'sublation" (Aufhebung). Others regarded their own philosophy as a creative interpretation of Kant's system. The former group, the speculative idealists like Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, lost any specific interest in the foundations of the exact sciences — in the same way as scientists rarely sought contact with them: they rather tended to stress the gap between speculation and Wissenschaft. A scientific orientation was retained or revived among those philosophers who viewed themselves as authentic interpreters of Kant — from Solomon Maimon to the School of Marburg. Neo-Kantianism, like phenomenology a generation later, began with a protest against vulgar positivism (or psychologism). Yet Husserl — particularly in the Logische Untersuchungen — took some of his leading models from pure mathematics and tried to develop an empirical idealism of sorts, i.e. a taxonomy of concrete a priori entities; while the Neo-Kantians of Marburg (as opposed to those in Baden) were guided by models derived from mathematical physics.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund

Kant Immanuel

Fichte Johann Gottlieb

Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

Schelling Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph