Functional explanations in history

Carlos Pereyra

pp. 59-70

in: Robert S. Cohen (ed), Mexican studies in the history and philosophy of science, Berlin, Springer, 1995

Abstract

During the development of the theory known as historical materialism, concern about the precise nature of the explanations that such a theory makes possible has been extremely meager. There has been some discussion of the idea that we are dealing with dialectical explanations about the workings of society as well as about the observable transformations in such a way of operation. Emphasis is on the dialectical quality of the explanations furnished by historical materialism, and it is common to make reference to the notion of totality and to the role that is played in the latter by contradictions as the ultimate foundation for change. Whatever might be the possibility of conferring a larger content to the claim that explanations derived from historical materialism have a distinctive peculiarity ("dialectical"), the truth is that with it the need to relate them to other explanatory procedures used in the social sciences has not been eliminated. "... in particular, it can be asked whether historical materialism is a causal or functional theory, or whether it can be both" (McLennan, 1981, p. 45).