Virtue and the search for intrinsic goodness

pp. 197-219

in: Stephen Petro, Rationality, virtue, and liberation, Berlin, Springer, 2014

Abstract

In this chapter, I use the conclusions concerning the conceptual inextricability of deontic and aretaic concepts from  Chap. 4 and other insights from dialectical theory in  Chap. 3 and begin to apply these analyses to the concept of rationality I characterized and defined in  Chap. 2. The goal of this process, to be attained in  Chap. 6, is to demonstrate the existence of a linguistic-conceptual framework in the concept of rationality. By acknowledging and analyzing such a framework, I boldly argue, we can finally define "good." This is, I claim, because goodness and value find their meaning only within what I call the Rational Framework. I begin in earnest to advance toward this goal in this chapter by taking up some epistemological challenges concerning value intrinsicality and by exploring some promising theoretical frameworks.