Other theories of knowledge

pp. 80-93

in: Colin Cheyne, Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects, Berlin, Springer, 2001

Abstract

In Section 4.4,1 argued that any plausible theory of knowledge must include conditions that guarantee truth. Truth should not be tacked on as a further condition. This must be so in order to avoid the Gettier problem. I also argued that no internalist condition on knowledge could provide the necessary guarantee of truth. The only way that the truth of a belief can be assured is by a connection between fact and belief. In Chapters 4 and 5, I defended the claim that it is a causal link (more precisely, a k-causal connection) that is needed to make that connection. In this chapter, I examine alternative theories of knowledge that suggest a different sort of connection between fact and belief. In each case, I discuss whether or not the proposed connection is a necessary condition for knowledge and compare it with the k-causal condition.¹ I then discuss, putting objections to the particular theory to one side, whether or not the proposed connection allows knowledge of platonic objects.