Neither one nor many

Husserl on the primal mode of the I

Shigeru Taguchi

pp. 57-68

in: Nicolas de Warren, Shigeru Taguchi (eds), New phenomenological studies in Japan, Berlin, Springer, 2019

Abstract

Husserl's concept of "primal I" (Ur-Ich) is well known but difficult to understand. In this chapter, I present a clue to figuring out what is at stake in this concept. First, I refer to Husserl's claim that the primal I cannot be pluralized. This claim can be understood in the sense that this ego is neither one of many egos nor a single all-encompassing entity. Second, in order to show that this character of "neither-one-nor-many" is not anything extraordinary, I shall refer to the fact that in natural languages we encounter this same character. Finally, I will address the problem of our fundamental perspective from which we most usually see the world. By doing this, I will claim that the seemingly strange character of the "primal I" indicates an experience that is "too obvious' to face in our daily life.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund