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Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Berlin

Year: 2013

Pages: 36-51

ISBN (Hardback): 9781349449293

Full citation:

Gottfried Gabriel, "Truth, value, and truth value", in: Judgement and truth in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology, Berlin, Springer, 2013

Truth, value, and truth value

Frege's theory of judgement and its historical background

Gottfried Gabriel

pp. 36-51

in: Mark Textor (ed), Judgement and truth in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology, Berlin, Springer, 2013

Abstract

In Frege's theory of judgement, the concept of truth is closely connected with the concept of assertoric force — a connection which justifies us in speaking of a (truth) theory of acknowledgement (Anerkennung). Frege is well aware of the paradoxical nature of his attempts to explicate his views (i.e. to express them in language). The paradox arises because we are concerned here with saying what cannot be (logically) said. Frege thus anticipates Wittgenstein's view that the categorial discourse in philosophy does not consist of sentences with a truth value, but rather of "elucidations'. Two things are central to Frege's theory of acknowledgement: first, the distinction between the act of judging (pragmatically expressed through the judgement stroke) and the content of judgement; and second, the value-theoretic understanding of the notion of truth values. It will be shown that in developing his own logic, Frege was inspired by traditional logic, and by the Southwest School of Neo-Kantianism in particular.

Cited authors

Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Berlin

Year: 2013

Pages: 36-51

ISBN (Hardback): 9781349449293

Full citation:

Gottfried Gabriel, "Truth, value, and truth value", in: Judgement and truth in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology, Berlin, Springer, 2013