Peirce and Wittgenstein's on certainty

Arnold E. Johanson

pp. 171-186

in: Guy Debrock, Menno Hulswit (eds), Living doubt, Berlin, Springer, 1994

Abstract

In On Certainty Wittgenstein remarked "So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism" (Wittgenstein 1969:422).¹ It is rather difficult to determine precisely what Wittgenstein was trying to say that sounds like pragmatism. It is even more difficult to interpret the remark that immediately follows, "Here I am being thwarted by a kind of Weltanschauung" No matter what Weltanschauung was thwarting him, however, Wittgenstein did say several things in On Certainty that sound like pragmatism. He especially said several things that sound like Peirce's pragmaticism. (My copy of On Certainty is littered with marginal "Cf. CSP" notes). This paper will point out some of the Peircean aspects of Wittgenstein's epistemology, exploring the similarities and differences. It will be clear that Wittgenstein was not a pragmaticist, but, coming from a radically different perspective, he did reach several conclusions similar to those of Peirce. I will not be claiming that Wittgenstein was directly influenced by Peirce, nor will I be looking for evidence of historical influence. Any awareness Wittgenstein had of Peirce was probably second hand, and the pragmatism he talked of was probably a very generic variety.²

Cited authors

Wittgenstein Ludwig

Peirce Charles Sanders