Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of "corporality' and "alerting capacity'

John O'Regan

Erik Myin

Alva Noé

pp. 369-387

in: Steve Torrance (ed), Enactive experience, Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 4 (4), 2005.

Abstract

How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do.