Abstract
For an immodest jurisprudence, there is nothing beyond social norms, nothing beyond law. Gillian Rose was sharply critical of theorists — whether they were sociologists, philosophers, or theologians — who appealed to something beyond social norms, a position she associated with avatars of neo-Kantianism. Rose was critical of natural law theorists for just this reason (Rose 1984). Natural law theorists, on her view, first answer the question of right (for example, with an appeal to "morality' or "reason' or "God's will') before addressing the question of fact, the question of what is and what is not a law. Only laws that are authorized by an answer to the question of right are really laws. The task of jurisprudence, for the natural law theorist, involves determining which laws conform to the prior authority and which do not. If a law is determined not to conform to the prior authority, the natural law theorist holds that it is not really a law, and it should be changed (Finnis 1980; Murphy 2006).