Uncovering of the sphere of transcendental being as monadological intersubjectivity

pp. 89-151

in: Edmund Husserl, Cartesian meditations, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1960

Abstract

As the point of departure for our new meditations, let us take what may seem to be a grave objection. The objection concerns nothing less than the claim of transcendental phenomenology to be itself transcendental philosophy and therefore its claim that, in the form of a constitutional problematic and theory moving within the limits of the transcendentally reduced ego, it can solve the transcendental problems pertaining to the Objective world. When I, the meditating I, reduce myself to my absolute trans e dental ego by phenomenological epoché do I not become solus ipse; and do I not remain that, as long as I carry on a consistent self-explication under the name phenomenology? Should not a phenomenology that proposed to solve the problems of Objective being, and to present itself actually as philosophy, be branded therefore as transcendental solipsism?