Outlines of a pragmatic theory of truth and error in computer simulation
pp. 121-136
in: Michael M. Resch, Andreas Kaminski, Petra Gehring (eds), The science and art of simulation I, Berlin, Springer, 2017Abstract
The highly dynamic development of simulation technologies is propelled by the expectation that increasingly high-performing forecasting instruments can and will be employed. In current discussions, reference to "high-performing forecasting instruments' combines two perspectives that stand in an unresolved relationship to one another, which is philosophically revealing: forecasts as true, as in adequate, representations versus performance measured by the success of the technical practice. While the first perspective presupposes a theory of truth based on realism (adequate representations), the second orients itself towards pragmatic representations of truth. Once this is made explicit, a shortcoming in the existing philosophy of simulation becomes evident. An intense debate on the verification and validation of simulations has failed to address the theory of truth. This article undertakes a discussion on a theory of truth suitable for computer simulation that is not only based on a theoretical interest, but also on a practical one.