Perceptual objectivity and the limits of perception

Mark Textor

pp. 879-892

in: Objectivity, space, and mind, Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 18 (5), 2019.

Abstract

Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mind-independent particulars. Why and with what right do we hold this view? Early phenomenologists argue that the common sense view is our natural starting point because we experience objects as mind-independent. While it seems unsurprising that one can perceive an object being red or square, the claim that one can experience an object as mind-independent is controversial. In this paper I will articulate and defend the claim that we can experience mind-independence by mainly drawing on the work of the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker who, in turn, built on Husserl's work. In the development of this claim the notion of a limit – either a maximum or minimum – of perception will play an important role.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund