
Publication details
Year: 2014
Pages: 263-285
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "Dreams", Synthese 191 (2), 2014, pp. 263-285.


Dreams
an empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness
pp. 263-285
in: Gualtiero Piccinini (ed), Neuroscience and its philosophy, Synthese 191 (2), 2014.Abstract
Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science.
Publication details
Year: 2014
Pages: 263-285
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "Dreams", Synthese 191 (2), 2014, pp. 263-285.