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Publication details
Year: 1988
Pages: 185-200
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "National security games", Synthese 76 (2), 1988, pp. 185-200.
Abstract
Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games. A generic two-person game called the Conflict Game, which captures strategic features of such variable-sum games as Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma, is then analyzed. Unlike these classical games, however, the Conflict Game is a two-stage game in which each player can threaten to retaliate — and carry out this threat in the second stage — if its opponent chose noncooperation in the first stage.
Publication details
Year: 1988
Pages: 185-200
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "National security games", Synthese 76 (2), 1988, pp. 185-200.