Eidetic results in transcendental phenomenology

against naturalization

Richard Tieszen

pp. 489-515

in: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 15 (4), 2016.

Abstract

In this paper I contrast Husserlian transcendental eidetic phenomenology with some other views of what phenomenology is supposed to be and argue that, as eidetic, it does not admit of being "naturalized' in accordance with standard accounts of naturalization. The paper indicates what some of the eidetic results in phenomenology are and it links these to the employment of reason in philosophical investigation, as distinct from introspection, emotion or empirical observation. Eidetic phenomenology, unlike cognitive science, should issue in a "logic' of consciousness. Instead of being derived from empirical investigations its results should consist of high-level background conditions that are necessary for cognitive science to be possible in the first place. To negate these conditions is to be faced with certain types of "material' contradictions. Some analogies with science – mathematical science – are used to develop the argument.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund