Perceiving the intrinsic properties of objects

Ignacio Ávila

pp. 55-71

in: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 14 (1), 2015.

Abstract

In this paper, I discuss Noë's enactive account of our perceptual encounter with the intrinsic properties of the surrounding objects. First, I argue that this view falls into a dilemma in which either we are left without a satisfactory explanation of this encounter or, in order to keep Noë's view, we must abandon our ordinary intuitions about the ontological status of the intrinsic properties of objects. Then, I show that, strikingly, there is a suggestive unofficial strand running in Noë that avoids this dilemma. Finally, I argue this unofficial thread leads to a view about the perspectival character of perceptual experience and the place of sensorimotor understanding in perceptual content that is to be preferred over Noë's official view about these issues.

Cited authors

Noë Alva