The philosophy of Aron Gurwitsch

Frederick Kersten

pp. 21-30

in: Robert Stufflebeam (ed), To work at the foundations, Berlin, Springer, 1997

Abstract

At various times I have had occasion to reflect on different aspects of the Philosophy of Aron Gurwitsch: on the critical center of his thought ("The Constancy Hypothesis in the Social Sciences"), on the bearing of some of the results of his thought on contemporary problems in transcendental phenomenology ("Heidegger and Transcendental Phenomenology," "The Life-Concept and the Life-Conviction"), even on the philosophical attitude that seemed everywhere to underlie his thought ("Remarks on the Philosophical Attitude and Approach in the Philosophy of Aron Gurwitsch"), and, as a result of my last conversation with Aron Gurwitsch, on the "originality" of his transformation of the phenomenological problem of intentionality ("The Originality of Gurwitsch's Theory of Intentionality").² In addition, the experience of translating some of Gurwitsch's work into English provided a unique opportunity to explore many of his ideas with him (such as those in "The Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego" dealing with the inner workings of Gestalt psychology as much as with the telos of the inner workings of his gradual transformation of basic ideas in Husserl concerning attention, the ego, and the internal organization of the noema.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund

Heidegger Martin

Gurwitsch Aron