Introduction

pp. 1-12

in: Robin Rollinger, Husserl's position in the school of Brentano, Berlin, Springer, 1999

Abstract

While the phenomenological movement is certainly one of the most significant philosophical currents of the twentieth century,¹ it is nonetheless only natural to raise the question whether phenomenology involves any definite link with science or any aspiration to philosophize scientifically. It is in fact not uncommon to associate it with existentialism or with one of the explicitly anti-scientific tendencies which prevail nowadays. Historically speaking, such associations are quite understandable. There are, after all, prima facie compelling reasons to see Edmund Husserl, indisputably the central figure of the phenomenological movement, as one of the main forces behind contemporary anti-scientific philosophy. Most notably, he was the one responsible for advancing the career of Martin Heidegger, who inspires much of the philosophy of this kind in certain academic circles and beyond.