Justification, pluralism and pragmatism

the problems and possibilities of a peircian epistemic justification of liberalism

Matt Sleat

in: Pragmatism and the social dimension of doubt, European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 5 (2), 2013.

Abstract

This article explores the problems and possibilities of offering a compelling Peircian epistemic justification of liberal institutions, primarily via critical engagement with the work of Cheryl Misak, and uses this to make some wider points about the criteria for a successful justification of liberalism in conditions of pluralism. Though the article argues that Misak’s argument fails to take seriously enough the problem that pluralism poses for the justification of liberal politics in modern democratic societies, and that in this sense a version of political liberalism is superior, it nevertheless ends by tentatively suggesting an alternative account of a Peircian epistemological justification that has some potentially promising and attractive features.

Cited authors

Misak Cheryl