The primacy of cognition — or of perception?
a phenomenological critique of the theoretical bases of science education
pp. 129-151
in: Fabio Bevilacqua, Enrico Giannetto, Michael R. Matthews (eds), Science education and culture, Berlin, Springer, 2001Abstract
This paper is a phenomenological critique of a particular trend in educational research and practice, which is identified as "cognitivism". The basic feature of this trend is a one-sided and exclusive focus on conceptual cognition and concept formation, with a simultaneous neglect of sense experience. It is argued that this kind of thinking is the result of the reception by education of epistemological theories, which have an objective alien to that of education, which is the all-round development of human personality. The discussion draws mainly upon the philosophies of Dewey, Husserl and Merieau-Ponty. It is argued that present, mainstream theories of science education need to be complemented with phenomenological perspectives. This would make the transition from immediate lifeworld experience to the idealizations of scientific theories less difficult for students. It would also contribute towards less alienation between man and nature.
