The pseudorealization fallacy and the Chinese room argument

James H. Moor

pp. 35-53

in: James H. Fetzer (ed), Aspects of artificial intelligence, Berlin, Springer, 1988

Abstract

John Searle with his now-famous Chinese room argument (1980, 1982, 1984) challenges the basis for a strong version of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Searle's argument has generated diverse and often strong reactions. Roland Puccetti says, "On the grounds he has staked out, which are considerable, Searle seems to me completely victorious," (1980, p. 441). Douglas Hofstadter remarks, "This religious diatribe against AI, masquerading as a serious scientific argument, is one of the wrongest, most infuriating articles I have ever read in my life" (1980, p. 433). My reaction to Searle's argument is that it is dead right and dead wrong. That is, his argument is right about a wrong conception of AI and wrong about a right conception of AI. But regardless of one's position on the Chinese room argument, there is no doubt that the argument raises critical issues about the nature and foundation of AI.

Cited authors

Searle John

Hofstadter Douglas