On indeterminate probabilities

Isaac Levi

pp. 107-129

in: Horacio Arló-Costa, Vincent F. Hendricks, Johan van Benthem (eds), Readings in formal epistemology, Berlin, Springer, 2016

Abstract

SOME men disclaim certainty about anything. I am certain that they deceive themselves. Be that as it may, only the arrogant and foolish maintain that they are certain about everything. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider how judgments of uncertainty discriminate between hypotheses with respect to grades of uncertainty, probability, belief, or credence. Discriminations of this sort are relevant to the conduct of deliberations aimed at making choices between rival policies not only in the context of games of chance, but in moral, political, economic, or scientific decision making. If agent X wishes to promote some aim or system of values, he will (ceteris paribus) favor a policy that guarantees him against failure over a policy that does not. Where no guarantee is to be obtained, he will (or should) favor a policy that reduces the probability of failure to the greatest degree feasible. At any rate, this is so when X is engaged in deliberate decision making (as opposed to habitual or routine choice).