Explanatory pluralism in psychiatry

what are we pluralists about, and why?

Raffaella Campaner

pp. 87-103

in: Dennis Dieks, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas Uebel, Marcel Weber, Maria C. Galavotti (eds), New directions in the philosophy of science, Berlin, Springer, 2014

Abstract

Progress in molecular-genetic, neurological, epidemiological, psychological, and socio-economic inquiries into psychiatric diseases – to mention but some of the fields involved – is flanked by burgeoning philosophical reflections on mental disorders and on psychiatry as a discipline. The multifactorial and multilevel nature of these pathologies, the problematic mind-brain relation, nosologic, diagnostic and therapeutic issues all demand conceptual and methodological clarification. In recent years, pluralistic stances have been put forward both from the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychiatry perspective and from that of psychiatry itself in the elaboration of models of diseases and their explanation. Starting from a close look at some recent works on the ways in which psychiatrists actually deal with mental disorders, this contribution aims to shed some light on what explanatory pluralism endorsed in psychiatry can amount to, what motivates it and what implications it can have.