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Publication details

Year: 2007

Pages: 127-155

Series: Synthese

Full citation:

Neil Levy, "Doxastic responsibility", Synthese 155 (1), 2007, pp. 127-155.

Doxastic responsibility

Neil Levy

pp. 127-155

in: Synthese 155 (1), 2007.

Abstract

Doxastic responsibility matters, morally and epistemologically. Morally, because many of our intuitive ascriptions of blame seem to track back to agents’ apparent responsibility for beliefs; epistemologically because some philosophers identify epistemic justification with deontological permissibility. But there is a powerful argument which seems to show that we are rarely or never responsible for our beliefs, because we cannot control them. I examine various possible responses to this argument, which aim to show either that doxastic responsibility does not require that we control our beliefs, or that as a matter of fact we do exercise the right kind of control over our beliefs. I argue that the existing arguments are all wanting: in fact, our lack of control over our beliefs typically excuses us of responsibility for them.

Publication details

Year: 2007

Pages: 127-155

Series: Synthese

Full citation:

Neil Levy, "Doxastic responsibility", Synthese 155 (1), 2007, pp. 127-155.