On the theory of the theoretical attitude of the phenomenologist

what the epoché means and accomplishes

pp. 296-315

in: Edmund Husserl, First philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 2019

Abstract

Before I can further elucidate this disinterestedness, I have to first elucidate the more general phenomenon, which perhaps accompanies a splitting of the I, that of the ambiguity in belief and more generally in position-taking comportment, according to which, unlike the usual case, the reflecting I does not participate in the positiontaking of the lower I (indeed, even perhaps rejects it), at which it has directed itself in reflection.1 An example for this is the Skeptic, who actively lives through his perceptual belief in a straightforward perspective on his | external world of perception in the harmony of his perceiving and cannot but, as a concordantly perceiving I, have these things and this world given as reality.