The traditional lack of distinction between uf and uo

pp. 107-137

in: Ignacio Angelelli, Studies on Gottlob Frege and traditional philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 1967

Abstract

The present chapter is devoted to a consideration of Frege's (or modern logic's) accusation that traditional logic has not distinguished das Fallen eines Einzelnen unter einem Begriff from Unterordnung of concepts. After formulating the problem (4.1), the previous exposition of the traditional predication theory is completed (4.2). I next try to show that traditional predication theory cannot be viewed as a less fortunate presentation of the Fregean approach, as if it belonged to the same line of development. Indeed traditional predication theory is of another kind (4.3). The most important systematic reason responsible for this is next examined (4.4). Finally, some examples are given in which the distinction UF and UO is shown to be intrinsically required by the very traditional doctrines (and not only by our retrospective projections) (4.5). A brief remark on unit-classes in traditional philosophy is added (4.6).