The pyrrhonian roots of Hume's scepticism
pp. 71-100
in: , David Hume, sceptic, Berlin, Springer, 2016Abstract
A strong influence of Pyrrhonism on Hume's thought explains why he so easily accepted the weakness of reason as a predicament we have to live with. Hume's corrected (for some, perfected) version of Pyrrhonism follows on the sceptical principle that we cannot see behind appearances, but newly asserts the power of natural inclinations in life. Hume's principal correction of Pyrrhonism consists not in diluting radical (excessive) scepticism in epistemology, but in allotting intense reflection and instinctive beliefs their own domains. Hume daringly asserted a disparity that involves a division of labour between reason and nature in place and time. In contrast to the old Pyrrhonism Hume set out to redefine ataraxia from a state of life lethargy to embracing life with all its pleasures. Hume teaches how to be happy, moral, socially active citizens and how to promote tolerance in all these areas of human behaviour. It is in common life, in moral and social areas, that mitigated scepticism has its role – it put us in a pleasant frame of mind, makes us feel agreeable and cultivates calm passions.