Some problems of the theory of norms

Kazimierz Opałek

pp. 181-200

in: Kazimierz Opałek, Selected papers in legal philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 1999

Abstract

When considered from the standpoint of their (basic) meaning and function, norms can be said to belong to a larger group of statements — statements expressing commands, prohibitions, permissions, wishes, advice, approval, disapproval, and the like. All these statements have the same general kind of meaning characterized by R. Carnap as "the optative meaning"¹, and the function of influencing behaviour. In connection with this group of statements many difficult problems arise, such as their cognitive (descriptive) meaning components² and differentiating these statements into sub-groups among which the so-called norms and value judgments are attracting most attention. Several attempts have been undertaken to introduce some division into this large group on a semantic basis (e.g. by introducing the concepts of emotive, evaluative, directive and critical meaning). Many authors are emphasizing the differences in function of utterances (which involves some difficult problems concerning the relation between functions and meaning), and, more recently; on the uses of linguistic expressions (the ordinary-language approach).³ These conceptions having their merits (they cannot be discussed here) are in need of further discussion and elaboration. It should also be stressed that the, efforts of different circles of scholars working separately on these problems should be brought together. As now the matter is standing, there is some gap between the efforts of a group of philosophers concentrating on the problems of value judgments and of scholars interested in norms (mostly legal theorists).

Cited authors

Carnap Rudolf