Passivity as necessary condition for ethical agency?

Editor's introduction

Benda Hofmeyr

pp. 1-11

in: Benda Hofmeyr (ed), Radical passivity, Berlin, Springer, 2009

Abstract

The question concerning the "radical passivity' of the ethical agent undoubtedly constitutes the proverbial 64,000 dollar question in Levinas scholarship and reception. In other words, the question concerning the radically passive ethical agent as opposed to the active autonomous agent, with the freedom to act independently without an inherent imperative or inner directive steering its actions, is the decisive issue separating supporters of Levinas from his critics. Levinas claims that taking responsibility for others in need follows from neither sympathy and compassion nor a free, rational weighing of options. Rather, ethical action is made possible by a primordial, an-archical responsibility that is pre-consciously felt as the "Otherwithin- the-Same'. We are passively obligated before we can actively choose to help. Levinas therefore argues that the needy other disturbs and incapacitates our customary egocentric ways, and that this "radical passivity' enables us to recognize our inherent responsibility towards others in need. The present collection of essays seeks to appreciate this central conviction underpinning the entire oeuvre of Levinas and to provide its readers with a sturdy framework for conceptualization, problematization and in-depth analysis. In addition, it offers us a much needed critical revaluation of key issues in Levinas's thought which are, more often than not, uncritically assimilated or taken as a matter of fact.

Cited authors

Levinas Emmanuel